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Abstract—In this letter, we consider the problem of detecting a
high dimensional signal based on compressed measurements with
physical layer secrecy guarantees. We assume that the network
operates in the presence of an eavesdropper who intends to
discover the state of the nature being monitored by the system.
We design measurement matrices which maximize the detection
performance of the network while guaranteeing a certain level of
secrecy. We solve the measurement matrix design problem under
three different scenarios: a) signal is known, b) signal lies in a
low dimensional subspace, and c) signal is sparse. It is shown
that the security performance of the system can be improved by
using optimized measurement matrices along with artificial noise
injection based techniques.
Index Terms—Compressive detection, physical layer secrecy,
distributed processing, eavesdropper
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of compressive sensing (CS) mostly deals with
reconstructing a sparse signal based on a small number of
measurements obtained via low dimensional projections [1]–
[3]. The use of CS based measurement schemes in solving
inference problems, such as, detection, classification and es-
timation has also attracted a considerable attention in the
recent literature [4]–[7]. The random measurement scheme
used in [4]–[7] provides universality for a wide variety of
signal classes, but it fails to exploit the signal structure that
may be known a priori. To improve performance, optimization
of the measurement scheme can be performed by exploiting
the signal structure. Measurement matrix design in the context
of sparse signal recovery from compressed measurements has
been considered in the past [8]–[12]. In [13], the authors con-
sidered the measurement matrix deign problem in the context
of sparse signal detection based on compressed measurements.
In all of these works [8]–[13], measurement matrices were
constrained to the class of tight frames in order to avoid
coloring the noise covariance matrix. In [14], the measurement
matrix was designed for the detection of a known sparse
signal from compressive measurements. In the same context,
heuristic or algorithmic approaches were proposed by [15] for
measurement matrix design.
In this letter, our goal is to design measurement matrices for
compressive detection so that a desired performance level is
achieved under physical layer secrecy constraints. To that end,
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Fig. 1. System Model
we employ the collaborative compressive detection (CCD)
framework proposed in our previous paper [16]. In a CCD
framework, the fusion center (FC) receives compressed obser-
vation vectors from the nodes and makes the global decision
about the presence of the signal vector. The transmissions by
the nodes, however, may be observed by an eavesdropper. The
secrecy of a detection system against eavesdropping attacks
is of utmost importance in many applications [17]. Recently,
a few attempts have been made to address the problem of
eavesdropping threats on distributed detection networks [18].
Security issues with CS based measurement schemes have
been considered in [19]–[21], where performance limits of
secrecy of CS based measurement schemes were analyzed
(under different assumptions). In this work, we investigate the
problem from a design perspective and consider the problem
of measurement matrix design with secrecy guarantees in an
optimization framework. We show that the performance of
the CCD framework can be significantly improved by using
optimized measurement matrices (which exploit the underlying
signal structure) along with artificial noise injection based
techniques. More specifically, we design optimal measurement
matrices which maximize the detection performance of the net-
work while guaranteeing a certain level of secrecy considering
three different scenarios: 1) signal of interest s is known, 2)
s lies in low dimensional subspace, and 3) s is sparse.
II. OBSERVATION MODEL
A. Collaborative Compressive Detection
Consider two hypotheses H0 (signal is absent) and H1
(signal is present). Also, consider a parallel network (see
Figure 1), comprised of a fusion center (FC) and a set of
N nodes, which faces the task of determining which of the
two hypotheses is true. At the ith node, the observed signal,
ui, can be modeled as
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2H0 : ui = vi
H1 : ui = s+ vi
for i = 1, · · · , N , where ui is the P × 1 observation vector, s
is the signal vector to be detected, vi is the additive Gaussian
noise with vi ∼ N (0, σ2IP ) where IP is the P × P identity
matrix. Observations at the nodes are assumed to be condition-
ally independent and identically distributed. Each node carries
out local compression (low dimensional projection) and sends
a M -length compressed version yi of its P -length observation
ui to the FC. The collection of M -length (< P ) sampled
observations is given by, yi = φui, where φ is an M × P
measurement matrix, which is assumed to be the same for
all the nodes, and yi is the M × 1 compressed observation
vector (local summary statistic). Under the two hypotheses,
the compressed measurements are
H0 : yi = φvi
H1 : yi = φs+ φvi
for i = 1, · · · , N . The FC makes the global decision about the
phenomenon based on the received compressed measurement
vectors, y = [y1, · · · , yN ]. We also assume that there is an
eavesdropper present in the network who intends to discover
the state of the nature being monitored by the system.
B. Collaborative Compressive Detection in the Presence of an
Eavesdropper
To keep the data regarding the presence of the phenomenon
secret from the eavesdropper, in our previous work [16],
we used cooperating trustworthy nodes that assist the FC
by injecting noise in the signal sent to the eavesdroppers
to improve the security performance of the system. It was
assumed that B out of N nodes (or α = B/N fraction of the
nodes) tamper their data yi and send y˜i as follows:
Under H0:
y˜i =
 φ(vi +Di) with probability P
0
1
φ(vi −Di) with probability P 02
φvi with probability (1− P 01 − P 02 )
Under H1:
y˜i =
 φ(s+ vi +Di) with probability P
1
1
φ(s+ vi −Di) with probability P 12
φ(s+ vi) with probability (1− P 11 − P 12 )
where Di = γs is a P × 1 vector with constant values. The
parameter γ > 0 represents the noise strength, which is zero
for non noise injecting nodes. We assume that the observation
model and noise injection parameters are known to both the FC
and the eavesdropper. The only information unavailable at the
eavesdropper is the identity of the noise injecting nodes. Thus,
the eavesdropper considers each node i to be injecting noise
with a certain probability α. The FC can distinguish between
yi and y˜i. Note that, the values of (P 01 , P
0
2 ) and (P
1
1 , P
1
2 ) are
system dependent and cannot be optimized in many scenarios
which limits the secrecy performance of the system. Thus, in
this letter, we design optimal measurement matrix φ which can
be used along with artificial noise injection based techniques
to improve the security performance of the system.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We use the deflection coefficient as the detection perfor-
mance metric in lieu of the probability of error of the system.
Deflection coefficient reflects the output signal to noise ratio
and is widely used in optimizing the performance of detection
systems. The deflection coefficient at the ith node is defined
as
D(yi) = (µ
i
1 − µi0)T (Σi0)−1(µi1 − µi0)
where µij and Σ
i
j are the mean and the covariance matrix
of yi under the hypothesis Hj , respectively. Using these
notations, the deflection coefficient at the FC can be written as
D(FC) = BD(y˜i)+(N−B)D(yi). Dividing both sides of the
above equation by N , we get DFC = αD(y˜i)+(1−α)D(yi)
where DFC = D(FC)/N and will be used as the performance
metric. Similarly, the deflection coefficient at the eavesdropper
can be written as DEV = D(EV )/N = D(yˆi). Notice that
both DFC and DEV are functions of the measurement matrix
φ and noise injection parameters (α, γ) which are under the
control of the FC. This motivates us to design the optimal
measurement matrix for fixed noise injection parameters (α, γ)
under a physical layer secrecy constraint. The problem can be
formally stated as:
maximize
φ
αD(y˜i) + (1− α)D(yi)
subject to D(yˆi) ≤ τ
(1)
where τ ≥ 0, is referred to as the physical layer secrecy con-
straint which reflects the security performance of the system.
In our previous work [16], we have derived the expressions for
DFC and DEV (see Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 in [16]).
Using those expressions (1) reduces to:
maximize
φ
α(1− Pbγ)2
γ2Pt +
σ2
‖Pˆ s‖22
+ (1− α)‖Pˆ s‖
2
2
σ2
subject to
(1− αPbγ)2
γ2PEt +
σ2
‖Pˆ s‖22
≤ τ
(2)
where Pˆ = φT (φφT )−1φ, Pb = (P 01 − P 02 ) + (P 12 − P 11 )
Pt = P
0
1 + P
0
2 − (P 01 − P 02 )2 and
PEt = α(P
0
1 +P
0
2 −α(P 01 −P 02 )2) matrix. Next, we solve (2)
under various assumptions on the signal structure (e.g., known,
low dimensional or sparse).
IV. OPTIMAL MEASUREMENT MATRIX DESIGN WITH
PHYSICAL LAYER SECRECY GUARANTEES
First, we explore some properties of the deflection co-
efficient at the FC, DFC , and at the eavesdropper, DEV ,
which will be used to simplify the measurement matrix design
problem.
Proposition 1. Deflection coefficient both at the FC and the
Eve is a monotonically increasing function of DH =
‖Pˆ s‖22
σ2 .
Proof: The proof follows from the fact that both dDFCdDH >
0 and dDEVdDH > 0.
The above observation leads to the following equivalent
optimal measurement matrix design problem for compressive
detection:
3maximize
φ
δ = ‖Pˆ s‖22
subject to ‖Pˆ s‖22 ≤
σ2
(1−αPbγ)2
τ − γ2PEt
(3)
for any arbitrary signal s. Note that, for the random measure-
ment matrix δr = ‖Pˆ s‖22 = MN ‖s‖22 [4]. The factor M/N can
be seen as the performance loss due to compression as random
measurement matrix fails to exploit the signal structure that
may be known a priori. To improve performance, we consider
the optimization of the measurement matrix by exploiting
the signal structure while guaranteeing a certain level of
secrecy. We show that any arbitrary secrecy constraint can
be guaranteed by properly choosing the measurement matrix.
A. Known Signal Detection
First, we consider the case where s is known.
Lemma 1. When s is known, the optimal value of
the objective function of (3), is given by δ∗ =
min
(
‖s‖22, σ
2
(1−αPbγ)2
τ −γ2PEt
)
.
Proof: The proof follows from the fact that Pˆ is an
orthogonal projection operator, thus, ‖Pˆ s‖22 ≤ ‖s‖22.
Let us denote the singular value decomposition of φ =
U [piM , 0]V
T where U is an M × M orthonormal matrix,
[piM , 0] is an M × N diagonal matrix and V is an N × N
orthonormal matrix. Now, the optimal φ which achieves δ∗ is
characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. When s is known, the optimal φ which achieves
δ∗ in (3) is given by φ∗ = U [piM , 0](V ∗R)T where U and
diagonal piM > 0 are totally arbitrary,
R =
 cos θ 0 sin θ0 I 0
− sin θ 0 cos θ
 ,
θ is the parameter which controls the level of secrecy
such that θ = 0 if ‖s‖22 ≤ σ
2
(1−αPbγ)2
τ −γ2PEt
, and, θ =
cos−1
√
σ2/‖s‖22
(1−αPbγ)2
τ −γ2PEt
, otherwise. V ∗ = [v∗1 , · · · , v∗N ] is
any orthonormal matrix satisfying v∗i ⊥ s,∀i > M .
Proof: To prove the lemma, notice that
‖Pˆ s‖2 = sTV
[
IM 0
0 0
]
V T s =
M∑
i=1
s˜2i ≤ ‖s‖22
where s˜ = V T s. The upper bound or equality in the above
equation can be achieved if and only if s˜i = 0, ∀i > M .
The corresponding optimal measurement matrix for this case
is characterized by φ∗ = U [piM , 0]V T where the orthonor-
mal U and diagonal piM > 0 are totally arbitrary, while
V = [v1, · · · , vN ], as seen above, has to be an orthonormal
matrix satisfying vi ⊥ s,∀i > M . Now, the matrix (V R) is
a orthonormal matrix for any orthonormal V and observe that
the optimal V ∗ as given in the lemma is also orthonormal.
Thus, for optimal φ∗, we have
‖Pˆ s‖2 = sTV ∗R
[
IM 0
0 0
]
(V ∗R)T s = cos2 θ‖s‖22.
Next, using the definition of θ, the results in the lemma can
be derived.
If we define Proju(w) =
uTw
uTu
u and W = [w1, · · · , wN ]
with w1 = s and wk as any linearly independent set of
vectors, one possible solution for V ∗ in a closed form is:
V ∗ = [v1, · · · , vN ], where vk = uk‖uk‖2 and uk = wk −∑k−1
j=1 Projuj (wk). Note that, without physical layer secrecy
constraint (or when θ = 0) the optimal value of the objective
function is ‖s‖22. Thus, there is no performance loss due to
compression. With physical layer secrecy constraint, θ serves
as a tuning parameter to guarantee a certain level of secrecy.
This approach provides the optimal measurement matrix with a
secrecy guarantee for a known s. However, in certain practical
scenarios we do not have an exact knowledge of s. Next, we
consider the cases where s is not completely known.
B. Low Dimensional Signal Detection
In this subsection, we consider the case where s is not
completely known but is known to lie in a low dimensional
subspace and design φ so that the detection performance at the
FC is maximized while ensuring a certain level of secrecy at
the eavesdropper. We assume that s resides in a K-dimensional
subspace where K < N . That is to say, s can be expressed
as s = Dβ where D is an N × K matrix, whose columns
are orthonormal, and β is the K × 1 signal vector. Without
loss of generality, we assume that ‖β‖22 = 1. Next, we look
at the following two cases: 1) D can be designed, 2) D is
fixed and known. For both the cases, we assume that β is
deterministic but unknown and find φ which maximizes the
worst case detection performance. Formally, for the case where
D is a design parameter, the problem can be stated as
max
φM×N
max
DN×K
min
βK×1
δ = ‖PˆDβ‖22
subject to ‖β‖22 = 1, ‖PˆDβ‖22 ≤ ∆
(4)
where ∆ = σ
2
(1−αPbγ)2
τ −γ2PEt
.
We state the Courant-Fischer theorem which will be used
to solve the above optimization problem.
Theorem 1. (Courant-Fischer [22]) Let A be a symmetric
matrix with eigenvalues λ1 ≥ · · · ≥ λN and S denote the any
j-dimensional linear subspace of CN . Then,
max
S: dim(S)=j
min
x∈S
xTAx
xTx
= λj .
Lemma 3. When s lies in a low dimensional signal subspace,
the optimal value of the objective function of (4) is given by
δ∗ = min
(‖β‖22,∆) if K ≤M , and δ∗ = 0, otherwise.
Proof: Using Courant-Fischer theorem, we can show that
the problem (4) without a physical layer secrecy constraint
is equivalent to max
φM×N
λk(Pˆ ). Now, the proof follows by
observing that Pˆ is the orthogonal projection operator and its
eigenvalues are given by λi = 1 for i = 1 to M and λi = 0
for i = M + 1 to N .
Next, we assume that K ≤M and characterize the optimal
measurement matrix φ∗ and the optimal subspace D∗.
4Lemma 4. When s = Dβ and K ≤M , the optimal (φ∗, D∗)
which achieves δ∗ should satisfy the following condition: for
any arbitrary φ = U [piM , 0]V T where V = [v1, · · · , vN ], the
optimal D∗ = cos θD with D = [v1, · · · , vK ].
Proof: Note that for optimal (φ∗, D∗), we have
‖Pˆ s‖2 = βT (D∗)TV ∗
[
IM 0
0 0
]
((D∗)TV ∗)T β
= βT
[
cos θIK 0
] [ IM 0
0 0
] [
cos θIK
0
]
β
= (cos θ)2
min(K,M)∑
i=1
(βi)
2
Observe min
β
min(K,M)∑
i=1
(βi)
2 = ‖β‖22 if min(K,M) = K
and 0, otherwise. Using the definition of θ, δ∗ can be achieved.
The above lemma can be interpreted as follows: for any
fixed φ, one can choose D accordingly, so that the upper bound
δ∗ can be achieved. Next, we look at the case where D is fixed
and we only optimize measurement matrix φ. Observe that,
max
φ
min
β
‖PˆDβ‖22 ≤ max
φ
max
D
min
β
‖PˆDβ‖22 = ‖β‖22.
For a fixed D, the optimal value δ∗ of the problem (4) serves
as an upper bound. To simplify the problem, we introduce
an (N ×N) matrix P to guarantee secrecy in the system. In
other words, yi = φPui where P is determined to guarantee
physical layer secrecy. Next, we find φ for which this upper
bound is achievable for a fixed D and P to secrecy.
Lemma 5. For the low dimensional signal case yi = φPs with
s = Dβ where D = [d1, · · · , dK ] is orthonormal, the optimal
measurement matrix (φ∗, P ∗), is given by P ∗ = cos θIN×N
and φ∗ = U [piM , 0](V ∗)T where the orthonormal U and di-
agonal piM > 0 are totally arbitrary, while V ∗ = [v1, · · · , vN ]
is such that vi = di for i = 1 to K and vi for i = K + 1 to
N are such that V forms an orthonormal basis.
Proof: The proof is similar to Lemma 4, thus, omitted.
For both the cases, where D can be designed and where D is
fixed and known, without secrecy constraint the optimal value
of the objective function is ‖s‖22. Thus, there is no performance
loss due to compression. With secrecy constraint, θ serves as
a tuning parameter to guarantee a certain level of secrecy.
C. Sparse Signal Detection
In this section, we assume that s is K-sparse in the standard
canonical basis and ‖s‖22 = 1. Also, the exact number of
the nonzero entries in s, their locations, and their values
are assumed to be unknown. We design φ which maximizes
the worst case detection performance by employing a lexico-
graphic optimization approach1. Formally, the problem is
max
φM×N
min
s
‖Pˆ s‖22
subject to ‖s‖22 = 1, ‖s‖0 = K,
‖Pˆ s‖22 ≤ ∆, φ ∈ AK−1
(5)
1We first find a set of solutions that are optimal for a k1-sparse signal. Then,
within this set, we find a subset of solutions that are also optimal for (k1+1)-
sparse signals. This approach is known as a lexicographic optimization.
where AK−1 is the set of solutions to the above optimization
problem for sparsity level K − 1 and ∆ is defined in (4).
Lemma 6. There is no performance loss while solving the
problem (5) if we restrict our solution space to be matrices
on the Stiefel manifold St(M,N), where
St(M,N) := {φ ∈ RM×N : φφT = I}.
Proof: The proof follows from the observation that piM =
IM for frames φ = U [piM , 0]V T in Stiefel manifold and the
value of ‖Pˆ s‖22 is independent of piM and U .
Next, we limit our focus on Stiefel manifolds and establish
an upper bound on the value of the objective function in (5) for
different sparsity levels. Later we find measurement matrices
which can achieve this upper bound.
Lemma 7. For the sparsity level K = 1, the optimal
value of the objective function of (5) is min
(
M
N ,∆
)
. For
the sparsity level K ≥ 2, an upper bound on the value of
the objective function is given by min
(
M
N (1− µ),∆
)
, where
µ =
√
N−M
M(N−1) .
Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 1 and Theorem
3 as given in [13], thus, omitted.
Lemma 8. The optimal measurement matrix (φ∗, P ∗), for the
K sparse signal case yi = φPs is given by:
• For the sparsity level K = 1, φ∗ is a uniform tight
frame with norm values equal to
√
M/N and P ∗ =
cos θIN×N ,
• For the sparsity level K ≥ 2, φ∗ is an equiangular
tight frame with norm values equal to
√
M/N and
P ∗ = cos θIN×N .
Proof: Proof follows from the definition of uniform (or
equiangular) tight frames [23] and observation that the upper
bounds in the Lemma 7 can be reached only by these frames.
Note that, without physical layer secrecy constraint (i.e.,
θ = 0), our results reduce to the ones in [13]. With physical
layer secrecy constraint, similar to previous cases, θ serves as
a tuning parameter to guarantee an arbitrary level of secrecy.
Also, it is shown that a real equiangular tight frame can exist
only if N ≤ M(M + 1)/2, and a complex equiangular tight
frame requires N ≤M2 [24]. When M and N do not satisfy
this condition, the bound in Lemma 7 can not be achieved and
one can employ a heuristic or algorithmic approach [15].
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We considered the problem of designing measurement ma-
trices for high dimensional signal detection based on com-
pressed measurements with physical layer secrecy guarantees.
It was shown that the optimal design depends on the nature
of the signal to be detected. Further, security performance of
the system can be improved by using optimized measurement
matrices along with artificial noise injection based techniques.
In the future, we plan to come up with efficient algorithms
to improve the worst-case detection probability for the cases
where equiangular tight frames do not exist.
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